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Abstract:  
Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach of 
contract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy in 
Civil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specific 
performance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany and 
France, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to be 
undertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We argue 
that it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcement 
that renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party, 
and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries) 
chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especially 
clear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actions 
has been abandoned as a legal remedy.   
At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs provides 
an additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theory 
of efficient breach, for damages and against specific performance 
as the general remedy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 We thank ,without implicating, Gerrit de Geest,  Peter Møgelvang Hansen, Ole Lando, Ejan Mackaay,  
Thomas Ulen and participants at the 2003 EALE conference in Nancy, and the 2004 ALEA conference at 
Northwestern University.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for contract breach 
have found support for their position in the alleged use of specific 
performance in Civil Law countries. Thus, Ulen states (p. 361):  
 
‘… It is worth noting that in the Civil Law countries specific 
performance is the routine contract remedy…’ 4 
 
In a footnote (note 117), Ulen then notes:  
 
‘Alternatively, it may be argued that specific performance is not, in 
practice, the routine contract remedy in Civil Law countries.  Some 
scholars note a trend toward convergence in contract remedies in 
the Civil and Common Law countries. See A. Von Mehren & J. 
Gordley, supra note 116, at 1122-23.  There is, however, a dearth 
of empirical evidence on this point.’ 
 
The present article investigates the use of specific performance in 
three Civil Law countries: Denmark, France and Germany, and 
under CISG5. In the first part of this article, we find that specific 
performance has been virtually abandoned6 in Denmark, when 
performance requires some action to be performed, and we find 
evidence to suggest that it is rarely used in France, Germany and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 Associate Professor of law and economics, Copenhagen Business School 
4 The quote continues: ` This is a difficult situation to understand if there is really something to 
Professor Kronman's contention that confining equitable relief to the case of unique goods 
corresponds to what freely contracting parties would prefer.  Perhaps the tastes of contracting parties 
in Western Europe are vastly different from those in the Common Law countries, but this is very 
doubtful…’  
5 UN Convention of the International Sales of Goods 
6 In the sense in which it will be defined here.  
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in international disputes regulated by the International Sales 
Convention, CISG.  
In the second part, we investigate the underlying reasons for the 
rare use of specific performance. We argue that for specific 
performance to be an attractive remedy to the conforming party, a 
costly system of enforcement must be set in place, which 
authorities have been reluctant to do. The costs have been 
regarded as out of proportion to the gain of applying specific 
performance rather than damages. Our main argument is that as a 
consequence of less than fully rigorous and effective enforcement, 
specific performance has (when available) become an unattractive 
remedy for plaintiffs.  
In the third part of this paper, we discuss whether the reluctance 
to enforce specific performance can be justified.  
First, the concept of specific performance needs a precise 
definition.  
 
On the Definition of Specific Performance 
 
The standard definition of specific performance is that when a 
party to a contract does not perform his or her obligations, e.g. due 
to late delivery or the delivery of defective goods, the other party 
can claim performance by the breaching party7 in accordance with 
the contract8. We will define this to mean that if performance does 
not take place, the State will sanction the breaching party, e.g. 
through periodic fines, until performance occurs. Note that this 
definition raises a difficulty well-known from the theory of property 
                                                          
7 Thus, the aggrieved party’s right to make a cover purchase (buy the good or the service somewhere else) 
and be compensated for the price difference by the party  in breach does not constitute specific 
performance;  in our terminology, it is a right to  damages. It is worth noting that the term specific 
performance is sometimes used for the right to a cover purchase in Civil Law, which may partly account 
for the impression that specific performance is more widespread in Civil Law than in Common Law, see 
Beale.  
8 Under Common Law, the primary remedy is damages,  and specific performance is generally granted for 
unique goods (and real estate), or at the discretion of the judge. 
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rules versus damage rules: If  the sanction is a one-time payment 
equal to the loss of the performing party, and paid to this party, 
specific performance becomes indistinguishable (in its pay-off 
structure) from damages. To avoid this, we shall define specific 
performance as a rule that sanctions non-performance  through a 
heavy sanction (and not only through a payment that equals the 
cost of non-performance). Thus, specific performance will be 
defined as a property rule and damages as a liability rule, in the 
sense of Calabresi and Melumad (1997) and Kaplow and Shavell 
(1996).     
As a final matter of terminology, we stress a distinction between 
duties to act and duties to give9, and term breaches of a duty to act 
an ‘action breach’, in contrast to the case where the goods already 
exist and only need to be handed over to the buyer. We do not 
claim that the duties to give are not enforced, in fact they often are. 
However, this article concerns duties to act.  
 
A. Empirical part: On the Use of Specific Performance in Civil Law  
 
In this section, we first provide an account of specific performance 
in Denmark, and then turn to Germany and France, and to 
contracts adjudicated under CISG. For the reader who is not 
interested in the detail, a summary can be found in section A6.  
 
A1. The Enforcement of Specific Performance in Denmark  
 
For commercial contracts, Danish contract law lays down that a 
party whose contractual rights have been violated may choose 
between specific performance and damages10. However, when it 
comes to enforcement, the Code of Procedure greatly restricts the 
                                                          
9 although it can in some cases be difficult to know whether a given duty falls in one or the other 
category.  
10 The non-breaching party may make a cover purchase and will often be recompensed under the damage 
measure.  
 5
number of cases for which specific performance will be enforced by 
the legal system. If the court grants a claim for specific 
performance, and the defaulting party continues to be in breach, 
the other party may require the enforcing authority (the bailiff) to 
enforce the claim. The rules of ultimate enforcement by the bailiff 
are provided in the Code of Procedure11, which stipulates that 
except in a specified class of cases12, ‘the bailiff converts the 
plaintiff’s claim into money damages’ (Code of Procedure §533). The 
bailiff cannot, e.g. by imposing coercive fines, force the defendant 
to perform certain actions13. However, there is one exception to the 
non-enforcement of specific performance of actions: if the judge 
has granted specific performance, and the defendant does not 
comply, the plaintiff may file a private, criminal suit against the 
defendant (according to §535 in the Code of Civil Procedure). Fines 
or even imprisonment may thereby be imposed on the defendant. 
However, there seems to have been only one such criminal suit (U 
1991.239.SH) in recent times, and in that case the plaintiff did not 
prevail. The incentive to file a criminal suit seems very limited. It is 
not without cost to the individual plaintiff (even though if he wins 
the case some of his observable costs will be paid by the defendant) 
and he is not awarded the fine. Furthermore, if the plaintiff prevails 
in a criminal suit, the defendant can only be sanctioned once for 
not performing (§535, footnote 3), and even if the defendant is 
sanctioned, she does not after the verdict have an incentive to 
perform. Still, one incentive to file suit does exist: if the breaching 
party performs, the criminal trial must be stopped (§535,2), and so 
filing suit may induce performance. However, if the defendant 
thinks she will prevail in the criminal trial, or is simply stubborn, 
                                                          
11 Law no. 469 (3. june 1993).  
12 The law states the enforcement in natura as the main rule, and conversion as the exception but this is 
only a matter of wording.    
13 This is reflected in practice. In an interview carried out by Ulrik Esbjørn, a student at Copenhagen 
Business School, a Danish enforcing agent  said: "As soon as some act needs to be performed by the 
defendant, we convert". 
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the suit is likely to have a negative present value to the plaintiff, 
since the fine is not paid to him and does not by itself induce 
performance. To conclude, the very questionable incentive to file a 
criminal law suit and the virtual absence of such suits in practice, 
together suggest that such suits are not a realistic possibility. 
Hence, specific performance is not enforced for action breaches.   
This leads us to the question whether claims for specific 
performance are nevertheless filed in court, despite the lack of 
ultimate enforcement.   
 
A2. The Granting of Specific Performance by Danish Courts 
 
The answer is that parties very rarely seek specific performance, 
and that courts even more rarely grant it. In a database covering 
cases reported in the Danish Weekly Law Report (Ugeskrift for 
Retsvæsen, hereinafter UfR) from 1950 till April 2000, and 
containing most of the important published cases but no 
arbitration awards,  we have found only a couple of published 
cases within the last five decades involving a commercial contract 
where the buyer claimed specific performance in a case concerning 
the sale of goods14, and in no instance was the claim granted by 
the court. In one case15, the court specifically referred to the lack of 
enforcement according to the above-mentioned §533 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure.  
However, two exceptions should be mentioned.  
As the first exception, courts do establish the right for the buyer to 
require the seller to cure a defect, and the right for the seller to 
cure the defect16. These may be viewed as rights to specific 
performance, and this raises the question why courts establish 
rights that will not be enforced by the bailiff.  However, the reason 
                                                          
14 See UfR 1989.1039H.  
15 UfR 1976.972V. 
16 In particular, these rights are enforced for consumer contracts. 
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is that when such a right is established and violated, the violator 
loses other rights that are in the end enforced as monetary claims, 
and it is therefore meaningful for the court to establish these rights 
or their violation, despite the fact that there is no ultimate 
enforcement in natura. Thus, if the seller does not cure a defect, 
the buyer obtains the right to a cover purchase as well as certain 
other rights. Similarly, if the buyer does not allow the seller to cure 
the defect when that is reasonable, the buyer’s right to 
compensation is limited to the claim that would remain after the 
seller’s cure. Thus, these rights to specific performance are 
enforced by monetary compensation, and not by periodic fines that 
are levied by the authorities until performance takes place, at least 
not when actions need to be performed17. Hence, these rights do 
not fall under the category of specific performance as defined in 
this article (i.e. as a property rule rather than as a damage rule).   
The second exception concerns construction contracts for which 
specific performance has in fact been granted and carried out by 
the breaching party. However, as a study by Lehmann Nielsen 
reveals for the case of Denmark, in all such cases both parties to 
the contract preferred specific performance to a cover transaction 
(p.178). The following case is an example18: a group of 
entrepreneurs had agreed to repair a group of houses, which 
suffered from defects that might prove costly in the future. After 
signing the contract, the entrepreneurs realized that the costs of 
repair were out of proportion to the gain. Experts confirmed in 
court that the expected future loss was very small in comparison to 
the expense of repair. Still, the Supreme Court voted by 3 to 2 to 
grant specific performance. This verdict could possibly have been 
enforced through a cover purchase as seems to be confirmed by the 
fact that the repairs were eventually carried out by the 
                                                          
17 Thus, we suspect that the outcome is not very different from what occurs under Common Law, where 
e.g. the duty to mitigate losses would tend to produce the same kind of behavior, although not stated as a 
rule of specific performance. 
18 It is the only such case in UfR (U1989, page 1039).  
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entrepreneurs19; they probably preferred this to a ‘cover 
purchase’20. Thus, the case again illustrates that specific 
performance is sometimes carried out under the threat of monetary 
sanctions, in this case the threat of a cover purchase (that leads to 
a monetary claim against the breaching seller).  
Our conclusion is that specific performance of actions is simply not 
a relevant remedy in the sense in which has been defined here. The 
parties operate under what is in fact a damage regime, since only 
damages are ultimately enforced (while the threat of a private, 
criminal suit is not credible if even available).  
 
A3. The Enforcement of Specific Performance in Germany and 
France  
 
As in the case of Denmark, in both Germany and France the non-
breaching party can generally choose between specific performance 
and damages. The question to be raised here is whether specific 
performance, if granted by the courts, will ultimately be executed 
in Germany and France.  
In the case of Germany, when it comes to the execution of claims of 
specific performance, the distinction21 is made between duties to 
act and duties to give (see Zweigert & Kötz 1998, pp. 470). In the 
former case, a further distinction is made as to whether the act 
could equally well be performed by someone else (i.e. is ‘vertretbar’, 
see § 887 in the Code of Civil Procedure, Zivilprocessordnung, 
ZPO). If substitute performance is available (at reasonable cost), a 
claim for specific performance will not be executed, but the plaintiff 
may conduct a cover purchase, and the bailiff (the 
Gerichtsvollzieher) will then execute the monetary claim in value 
equal to the cover purchase. Thus, when substitute performance is 
                                                          
19 Our source for this information is the parties’ lawyers. 
20 Compare this with the swimming pool cases from France and England mentioned by Beale p. 689 and 
691. 
21 It is a distinction which goes back to Roman law, see Dawson (1959).  
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available, the claim is, if not already at the court-level22, ultimately 
converted to a money claim. However, if substitute performance is 
not available, the breaching party can be threatened with a fine or 
imprisonment, if she refuses to deliver (§ 888 in ZPO). This has 
been a major difference to Danish law, since the change in the 
Danish Code of Civil Procedure in 1916. There are, however, 
further exceptions in German law: performance must not depend 
on the seller’s inspiration or special effort23 but must rather have a 
more routine character. Also, § 888 describes some other 
situations where the penal pressure is also not available, notably in 
employment contracts24.  
 
For the case of France, although the Code Civil provides the right 
to claim specific performance, this principle is modified in Art. II42, 
that prohibits any judgment obliging the seller to act in a particular 
way. The idea behind Art. II42 is that citizens are ‘free’ and should 
not be forced into a certain course of action by the State, unless 
important public interests are at stake. However, according to 
Zweigert & Kötz (1998, p. 475), how far this principle is carried in 
practice is unclear.  
Also the French Code Civil makes the distinction between an 
‘obligation de faire’ (to do) and an ‘obligation de donner’ (to give). 
For the case of ‘faire’, French courts administer a special system of 
fines (astreintes) that are paid from the breaching party to the 
conforming party, if the breaching party does not perform. 
However, the enforcement of the system of ‘astreintes’ is not strict. 
In the terms of Zweigert & Kötz (p.475): ‘We may sum up by saying 
that French law generally admits the issuance of judgments for 
                                                          
22 The most likely outcome is that the non-breaching party makes a cover purchase and sues for damages 
in the amount of the cover purchase which is then granted in accordance with the rule of expectations 
damages.  
23 This is often mentioned but according to Dawson no cases of this nature exist.   
24 We have been unable to find out the extent to which the German bailiffs will actually use coercive fines 
in such cases but we suppose that they will do so if the plaintiff requires it, since the law is quite clear on 
this matter.   
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performance in kind but enforces them in a very grudging 
manner’.25 
 
A4. On the Granting of Specific Performance in Germany and 
France 
 
For the case of Germany and France, no databases were available 
to us. Instead, we rely on the accounts by legal experts, and report 
a consensus in the comparative literature on contract breach, that 
damages is by far the dominant form of relief for actions breaches 
in both Germany and France.  
This consensus view was in fact already expressed by Ernst Rabel, 
who  stated in `Recht des Warenkaufs’  (1936) that the difference 
between Common Law and Civil Law is small in practice (see 
volume 1, p 375 ff.).  
Also, writing in 1959, Dawson (1959), while stressing the difference 
between enforcement in Germany and France, noted that for the 
case of Germany (p.530): ‘despite formal limitations (on the right to 
sue for damages, ed.) the damage remedy is in fact resorted to, by 
the choice of the litigants, in a high percentage of cases, especially 
in sales of goods and other commercial transactions’. 
In present time, the Principles of European Contract Law contains 
a section called ‘practical convergence’ (p. 400), where it is plainly 
stated that:  ‘The basic differences between Common Law and Civil 
Law are of theoretical rather than practical importance’.  
The only view to the contrary that we have been able to find is in 
‘Rechtsverwirklung durch Zwangsgeld’26, by Oliver Remien (1992) 
who discusses the German case-material. He writes (our 
translation)27: 
                                                          
25 Dawson (1959) criticized the ineffectiveness of the use of ‘astreintes’ and called the whole French 
system non-sensical due to the lack of effective enforcement , see p. 524-525. However, changes have 
occurred since Dawson wrote. We are grateful to Gerrit de Geest for pointing these changes out to us.   
26 `Enforcement of claims through fines’.  
27 ‘’Das Zwangsgeld findet beit unvertretbaren Handlungen ein weites und vielfältiges Anwendungsgebiet’’.  
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‘Fines are used as a means of coercion in many areas where 
substitute performance is not possible’.  
 
Some of the cases that he mentions do not involve (complex) 
actions to be taken, such as where a company is forced to render 
its accounts (p. 134, a case from 1933), but others do: One case 
from 1897 concerns the delivery of electricity to a hotel, and 
another case from 1985 concerns the reparation of a computer by 
the deliverer. Still, from the cases mentioned, the impression 
remains that specific performance is rarely used, especially in 
commercial transactions, and this is also the conclusion reached 
by Kötz and Zweigert (p. 484):  
‘In Germany… where the claim to performance is regarded as the 
primary legal remedy, it does not in practice have anything like the 
significance originally attached to it, since whenever the failure to 
receive the promised performance can be made good by the 
payment of money, commercial men prefer to claim damages rather 
than risk wasting time and money on a claim for performance 
whose execution may not produce satisfactory results’. 
The absence of specific performance should not be overstated: As 
in Common Law, specific performance is sometimes sought, 
granted and executed also in Germany and France. Thus, in 
Beale’s account of the French and the German systems, one can 
find cases from both Germany and France where specific 
performance is indeed applied (see Beale, p. 683-685). However, 
this seems particularly (but not exclusively) to be the case for 
construction contracts, where performance can often be induced 
under the threat of a cover purchase, and for the delivery of already 
existing goods, that fall outside the scope of this article.  
 
A5. Specific Performance in Cases Adjudicated under CISG   
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The CISG (United Nations Convention for the International Sale of 
Goods) was the first major international sales law accepted by a 
large number of nations. CISG is now ratified by more than 55 
countries around the world, including leading trade nations.  
Article 46 (1) provides that the buyer may require performance by 
the seller of his obligations28. However under article 28, a court is 
not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless the 
court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts 
of sale. This means that the courts of the Common Law countries 
such as USA, Canada, and Australia are not bound to grant 
specific performance. Still, to the extent that specific performance 
is available in Civil Law countries, we would expect to find some 
cases of contracts adjudicated under CISG, that involve specific 
performance.  
To see whether such cases exist we obtained date from the private 
UNILEX database and the following databases available on the 
internet; http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/database.html and 
www.jura.uni.freiburg.de These databases contain a large 
collection of cases adjudicated under CISG from all over the world, 
including both cases decided by national courts and arbitration 
awards. Almost all the  industrialized countries are represented in 
the data29. 
We found 200 cases where the question of specific performance vs. 
damages is present (often in the sense of the rights to cure defects 
and to have defects cured which are not rights to specific 
performance as defined here). What we did not find were cases 
where the buyer requests delivery of goods and the seller denies to 
deliver (claiming e.g. hardship). Of the 200 cases, only one case 
mentions a buyer who claimed specific performance in this sense30. 
A Russian enterprise had sold raw aluminum to a group of buyers 
                                                          
CISG gives both the seller and the buyer the right to claim damages instead of specific performance.  
29 An exception is Japan that has not yet ratified the convention.  
30 C.f. Zürich Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award ZHK 273/95 of 31 May 1996. 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960531s1.html 
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located in Argentina and Hungary. After the enterprise was 
privatized in December 1994, the new owners stopped delivery in 
February 1995, and the case was subsequently submitted to 
arbitration in Switzerland. The buyer’s request for specific 
performance was denied for reasons to which we shall return. We 
did not find other attempts to force delivery of goods. It may be 
because the rule of specific performance is so clear that it does not 
invite the kind of disagreement over court outcomes that would 
lead to trials. Or it may be that cases exist that have not been 
translated into English. These caveats do not allow us to conclude 
in strong terms, but our observations are at least consistent with 
the view that, for international sales of goods, the performing party 
generally prefers to sue for damages rather than to attempt to force 
performance31.  
 
A6. Summary of Empirical Findings 
 
In short, our main empirical observation is that specific 
performance is not enforced in Denmark for production contracts; 
the only final recourse for the plaintiff in case of non-performance 
is a private, criminal law suit, and since plaintiffs do not have an 
incentive to file such suits, they are virtually never filed. Thus, 
specific performance is not enforced as such; when it is granted, as 
in some construction contracts and in consumer contracts, it is 
enforced through a threat of monetary sanctions that serve as 
compensation to the other party (i.e. through damages). In 
Germany and France, while enforced (although with many 
exceptions), claims for specific performance are rare. There is a 
consensus among legal scholars that, in this area, differences 
between Civil and Common Law are not of practical importance, 
and it is therefore also not surprising that among the CISG-cases 
                                                          
31 In several cases, cover purchases are made and reimbursed under a rule of expectation damages.  
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available in English on the internet, we could not find a case where 
the court forced a party to deliver goods.   
 
B. Explanation of the Rare Use of Specific Performance  
 
It will now be argued that it may be costly to enforce specific 
performance, especially if the aim is to make it an attractive 
remedy for the plaintiff. 
 
B1. On the Role of Costly Enforcement  
 
The system of enforcement has two stages. At the first stage, if the 
plaintiff has claimed specific performance, the court decides 
whether specific performance or damages should be the remedy 
granted. If specific performance is granted, it may not be clear what 
it entails; it must often be made precise which actions the 
defendant has agreed to in the contract, and which have not been 
performed32. This may be costly for the court, since it must in some 
cases write down the exact obligations of the defendant. On the 
other hand, if damages are granted, the court must establish the 
amount of damages, which may also be costly, and which is not 
necessary when specific performance is granted. On balance, 
however, the costs of writing down the obligations seem higher on 
average than the cost of assessing damages.   
At the second stage, if the defendant does not comply either with 
the order of specific performance or with the payment of damages, 
the bailiff enforces the claim. In the case of damages, this is 
usually relatively straightforward; the assets of the defendant can 
be seized,  if necessary by force. In the case of specific 
performance, the bailiff can33 induce performance by imposing 
                                                          
32 This must be settled by the court, and not by the bailiff; potentially difficult issues of interpretation 
requires court-proceddings.  
33 In systems where specific performance is available.  
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periodic fines on the defendant, until he or she performs. This may 
be costly for at least two reasons. First, it may require spending 
resources on obtaining information about whether performance 
has in fact occurred. Naturally, this cost must also be incurred 
when the remedy is damages, but the point is that under a system 
of damages, this needs to be investigated only once by the judge, 
while under specific performance, it may have to be investigated 
both by the judge and by the bailiff, and possibly more than onc if 
non-performance continues. Multiple non-performances seem a 
distinct possibility34, especially when the relationship between the 
parties has turned unfriendly (in which case reputation effects may 
no longer act as a disciplining device)35. Second,  applying a system 
of coercive fines to induce performance is administratively costly, 
in part because administrative law sets procedures for how 
individuals can be coerced by the State, and these procedures 
involve costs36.   
We would like to emphasize the point that the costs mentioned 
above become substantial if the aim is to render specific 
performance a credible threat for the plaintiff. The credibility of the 
conforming party’s threat to claim specific performance is 
diminished by the breaching party’s threat to delay performance or 
to repeatedly underperform, and the breaching party’s threat to 
delay or mis-perform may well be credible unless enforcmement is 
strict37. Thus, before a court has decreed specific performance and 
the bailiff has decreed periodic fines, which in combination may 
take a long time (sometimes even years, but of course speed of 
process can be bought at a price), the value of performance to the 
                                                          
34 In some cases, constant supervision is  required and while it may not be impossible, it is likely to 
be costly (see Treitel, pp. 1032). 
Ulen (1984) argues the opposite, that reputation effects will induce good performance even in a 
sour relationship; it seems to us that this may perhaps sometimes, but far from always, be the case.  
36  From the experience of public law, it is apparent that the process does not always work efficiently. 
37 Recall the quote by Zweigert and Køtz (p.484):  `commercial men prefer to claim damages rather 
than risk wasting time and money on a claim for performance whose execution may not produce 
satisfactory results’.  
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non-breaching party will often have fallen substantially. This cost 
to the non-breaching party can as mentioned be further 
exacerbated by multiple non-performances, and these possibilities 
tend to make specific performance unattractive to the plaintiff. Of 
course, the system of enforcement could take these possibilities 
into account by e.g. compensating for delay (but it is often difficult 
to provide hard evidence for the cost of delay),  by penalizing 
multiple non-performances, and by speeding up the enforcement 
process. However,  such measures are all costly.   
In conclusion, specific performance is administratively more costly 
than damages, especially if it must be an attractive remedy to 
plaintiffs.  
To these administrative costs must of course be added the costs to 
the breaching party of being coerced into performing potentially 
very costly actions. In this article, we view specific performance as 
a rule that, when a contract is breached, establishes a new 
contract similar to the old in the requirements for performance, but 
enforced (explicitly) under a threat of periodic fines. Viewing 
specific performance in this way raises the following question: why 
is the system of periodic fines not applied in the original contract 
among the parties? The answer must lie in the fact that such fines 
are potentially very costly to the breaching party, since they force 
performance even when it is very costly (and hardship does not 
apply). As stressed by the theory of efficient breach, the efficiency 
loss that may hereby be incurred should naturally be viewed as a 
cost of specific performance38. If the parties renegotiate (which they 
cannot always be counted on to do), there will be the issue of hold-
up: the conforming party may attract beneficial terms in the 
renegotiation under the threat of specific performance. 
Anticiapating this, the seller will overinvest in performance.  
                                                          
If the parties renegotiate, which they cannot always be counted on to do, there will be the issue of 
hold-up, which will lead to too much effort in ensuring performance.  
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Taking these costs to the breaching party in account leads to the 
following trade-off in the choice of remedy: On one hand, if the 
system attempts to secure full and timely compliance, it will have 
to employ a strict system of enforcement. This may involve high 
administrative costs and will  impose costs on the defendant when 
costs of performance are high. On the other hand, if the system of 
enforcement is more lax, the plaintiffs threat of claiming specific 
performance loses credibility, because of the risk of delayed or 
defective performance.  
As will now be recounted, this trade-off was acknowledged when 
the decision was made to virtually abolish specific performance (of 
actions) in the Danish Code of Civil Procedure.  
 
B2.  Why Was Specific Performance of Actions Abandoned in 
Denmark? 
 
A law dating back to 1842 originally prescribed that if the 
breaching party continued not to perform after a court had decreed 
specific performance, he could be sanctioned to periodic fines or 
imprisonment. These sanctions were abandoned as a means of 
coercion in 1916 when the Code of Civil Procedure was established. 
Since then, specific performance of actions has not been enforced 
in Denmark.  
The main rationale39 behind this change was the perceived need to 
avoid in the final instance incarcerating a person in consequence of 
his breach of a commercial contractual obligation40. It was argued 
that this would violate a principle of proportionality and thereby be 
in conflict with fundamental principles of modern jurisprudence. It 
was also pointed out that heavy enforcement of specific performance 
                                                          
Based on a Parliamentary Report from 1899, see for references the Parliamentary Report 
(Betænkning) No. 1170 1989. 
40 see Parliamentary Report (Betænkning) No. 1170 1989 
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involves the risk of hold-up against the breaching party41, and that it 
is administratively expensive. These costs were judged not to be 
worth the benefit for the plaintiff of having recourse to specific 
performance42.  
In 1989 an expert committee investigated the need for 
reintroducing the enforcement of specific performance (in order to 
bring the Civil Code into better conformity with the provisions of 
contract law).  
The committee repeated the arguments just mentioned, although it 
acknowledged that the system of coercive fines can be employed 
without resorting to imprisonment in the case where fines are not 
paid. The committee’s main argument for not re-introducing 
specific performance and for not putting  into place again a costly 
system of sanctions, and costly procedures, was the low demand 
for specific performance among business people. The committee 
stated it as follows (p.31 in their Report43):   
`The fact that there has been no criticism (of the lack of specific 
performance, ed) and that the need for stricter enforcement in this 
area has not been expressed, has been decisive for the 
committee…’.  
  
To sum up the historical development, strict enforcement of 
specific performance was abandoned in 1916 (if not before), 
because it was seen as both unnecessarily coercive (compared with 
its benefit relative to damages) and administratively expensive. It 
was not reintroduced when up for evaluation, because of the 
perception that the demand for the remedy was to small to justify 
the costs of making the remedy available.  
 
                                                          
41 and that the plaintiff may speculate in which remedy to use: specific performance if prices go up 
and damages if prices fall (for seller-breach).  
Note that the same reasons have been given by Common Law judges for only enforcing specific 
performance under certain circumstances, see e.g. Beale pp. 710-713, and Treitel pp. 1033-34.  
43 Betænkning nr. 1170.   
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B2. Explaining the Overall Pattern of Specific Performance 
 
More generally, the presence of enforcement costs seems to be able 
to explain the overall pattern of enforcement of specific 
performance. Note e.g. the following features of the systems of 
enforcement:  
 
1. All systems distinguish between `duties to give´ and `duties to 
make´. This seems more attributable to the presence of 
enforcement costs than to the potential efficiency loss of specific 
performance, since the efficiency loss may arise both for duties to 
give and for duties to act, while the enforcement costs are relative 
small for duties to give compared to the enforcement costs of duties 
to act.   
2. Cover purchases are generally allowed in both Civil and 
Common Law (and, when a cover purchase is available, specific 
performance will not be enforced, at least not in Germany). Again, 
this seems more readily explainable as a way of economizing on 
enforcement costs than as a way of ensuring efficient production 
decisions. In terms of efficiency, cover purchases may pose some of 
the same issues a specific performance when the buyer’s valuation 
of the good is lower than the production cost of the alternative 
supplier, so the easy access to cover purchases does not seem to be 
grounded mainly on efficiency concerns. Rather, the main reason 
that a cover purchase is much more freely granted than specific 
performance seems to be that a cover purchase is much easier to 
enforce than specific performance.   
3. Employment contracts and contracts requiring the exercise of 
the seller’s inspiration or special effort44 are not enforced 
specifically in Germany (which is in this respect similar to the 
French system). This seems well explainable in terms of the costs 
of supervising and monitoring performance of such acts.  
                                                          
44 This is often mentioned but according to Dawson no cases of this nature exist.   
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4. Under CISG, it has been mentioned that the arbitration tribunal 
denied specific performance in the one case mentioned above in 
which it was claimed. It argued that it had no legal support, but 
the reasoning of the tribunal on this point is not clear45. What is 
more interesting in the present context is the further statement 
made by the tribunal. It stated that even if CISG was applied, the 
tribunal `fails to see how specific performance could be an 
appropriate remedy for buyers in this case´. The tribunal pointed to 
the problems associated with the ultimate enforcement of specific 
performance of contracts in Russia for the next eight or ten years. 
The tribunal thus pointed to the problem of constant monitoring or 
supervision of performance, and the high cost of repeatedly forcing 
performance.    
5. Also under Common Law, costs of enforcing claims for specific 
performance play an important role for when specific relief is 
granted. According to Treitel’s  account of English law (p. 1033), 
the cost of monitoring or supervising performance is one important 
factor for the rare granting of specific performance, while the 
`heavy-handed nature´ of specific relief, the `injustice´ of 
compelling the breaching party to perform at a loss, and the extent 
to which the the aggrieved party can be compensated through 
damages also play a role.  
 
C. Normative implications of the existence of enforcement costs 
 
When a remedy is costly to enforce, this will, ceteris paribus, tend 
to speak against its use. Two arguments may, however, be made to 
suggest that enforcement costs should be of little consequence.  
1. It may be argued that if the sanction for non-performance is very 
high (potentially including also the costs of enforcement necessary 
to render specific performance an attractive remedy for the 
                                                          
45 See reference to the case in footnote above. 
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conforming party), the costs of enforcement will not have to be 
incurred, since the sanction will deter non-consensual breach.  
We shall not go into the arguments of the theory of efficient breach, 
which the argument raises (see e.g. Shavell (2003)), but instead 
point to what we believe is a (further) weakness of the argument. 
The idea of very high sanctions for breach of contract 
underestimates in our view the imperfections of the legal process. 
Asymmetries of information may lead to error, and the possibility of 
error provides a reason not to apply too high sanctions. Imagine 
e.g. that a party in breach claims that it is impossible for him or 
her to perform the contract, because an indispensable employee 
has left the firm. If this is unverifiable to a court (is the employee 
really indispensable?), the court may either trust the firm, thereby 
rendering specific performance less available to the aggrieved party, 
or it may impose the very high sanction for non-performance. In 
the latter case, the costs of enforcement will have to be incurred, 
which is a waste of resources, and there will be an injustice to the 
breaching party, if the employee is really indispensable46.  
Or imagine that it is not clear which of two parties does not 
perform, but it seems to be one rather than the other; should the 
harsh penalty then be applied? When considering such 
possibilities, one appreciates why sanctions for breach cannot be 
too high, and why coercive fines and imprisonment47 was 
abandoned in Denmark in 1916 with reference to lack of 
proportionality between harm of breach and sanction for breach. 
The argument that one can simply impose a very high sanction 
that will then not have to be applied ignores the real world 
difficulties of devising an efficient (and just48) enforcement system.  
2. Another argument (see Schwartz (1984)) for letting the plaintiff 
choose between specific performance and damages is that one can 
                                                          
46 If periodic fines are applied, they will presumably have to be stopped at some point 
47 it the party has no assets, imprisonment may be necessary for the sanction to deter breach.   
48 Meaning here that large sanctions should not be imposed on the innocent. 
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simply let the plaintiff carry the costs of enforcement; the plaintif 
can then internalize the cost of enforcement in his or her choice. 
However, if the plaintiff is made to bear the cost of enforcement, his 
or her threat of claiming specific performance may not be credible. 
The defendant may then e.g. be able to impose costs on the plaintiff 
by delaying performance until a stage where enforcement costs 
have been incurred. If one cannot realistically impose very high 
sanctions on the defendant, and the plaintiff carries the cost of 
enforcement, it may become unattractive to claim specific 
performance, and such claims  may become to few to make it 
worthwhile to design the system to be ready to enforce specifically.  
In conclusion, we believe that enforcement costs (in a broad sense) 
provide an argument over and above the arguments in the efficient 
breach literature for advocating damages as the general remedy49.  
 
D. Some further implications of the empirical observations  
     
Our observations concerning the actual use of remedies for 
contract breach have, we believe, two further implications for the 
theory of contract breach.  
First, our observations suggest that the cover purchase is 
empirically more relevant than specific performance; cover 
purchases are routinely enforced and sought by plaintiffs in all of 
the three countries, and also under CISG. Also, cover purchases 
involve some of the same efficiency issues as specific performance 
when the seller has made specific investments and can supply the 
good at lower cost than alternative suppliers. We would therefore 
argue that a theoretical discussion of the extent to which cover 
purchases are allowed50 seems more practically relevant than a 
continued discussion concerning specific performance.  
                                                          
49 We believe that the common law system where specific performance is granted at the discretion of the 
judge may well be optimal, to the extent that damages cannot be granted more freely to reflect all of the 
plaintiffs losses.     
50 The cover purchase is analysed in Edlin (1997).   
 23
Second, in the analysis of contract breach remedies and of 
renegotiation design, it is important to study not only what the 
judge will state but also what the bailiff will eventually do. Broadly 
speaking, enforcement seems to be more difficult in practice than 
envisaged both in the literature on breach remedies and in the 
literature on renegotiation design51. Enforcement is a mechanism 
in itself, and the remedy of specific performance is not well defined, 
unless the mechanism of enforcement is specified.  
 
E. Conclusion   
 
We have provided evidence for the very limited use of specific 
performance of actions in Civil law countries. The remedy is 
available but rarely sought in Germany and France, and has been 
(virtually) abolished as a remedy for production contracts in 
Denmark. We argue that part of the explanation lies in the fact that 
specific performance is administratively costly to enforce in such a 
way as to prevent delay and multiple non-performances from being 
a risk to the plaintiff. The countries have chosen not to incur these 
costs. In our view, they may well have been justified in this choice; 
the theory of efficient breach provides the basic rationale for 
damages instead of specific performance as the general remedy, 
and enforcement costs adds to this rationale.  
 
References 
 
Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont & P. Rey.: “Renegotiation design with 
unveriable information”. 1994. Econometrica 62, pp. 257-282. 
 
Beale, Hugh: ‘‘Remedies for Non-Performance’’, chapter 6, 
especially pp. 674-716, in IUS Commune Casebooks on the 
                                                          
51 Such as Aghion et. al (1994) or Maskin and Tirole (1999) on incomplete contracting and elaborate 
mechanisms for renegotiation. 
 24
Common Law of Europe, Beale, Hartkamp, Kötz and Tallon, Hart 
Publishing, 2001.  
 
Calabresi, C. and Melamed D.: “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral”, in Law and economics. 
Volume 1. Theoretical and methodological foundations, 1997, pp. 
520-59 edited by Parisi, F. and Posner, R.   
 
Dawson, John P.: “Specific Performance in France and Germany”. 
1959. Michigan Law Review, vol. 57.  
 
Edlin S. Aaron: “Breach Remedies”. 1998. New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Law and Economics, Macmillan Press, London.  
 
Frost, Kim: “Ret og pligt til afhjælpning’’, article in Ugeskrift for 
Retsvæsen, U.2002B.384. 
  
Gomard, Bernhard & Møller, Jens: “Kommenteret Retsplejelov” 3 
bind (Commentary on the Danish Code of Procedure). 1994. Jurist 
og Økonomforbundets Forlag 5.udg.  
 
Kaplow, L and Shavell, S.: ‘Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: 
An Economic Analysis’ , 1996, Harvard Law Review, 109, pp. 713-
790.      
 
Kronman, A.: ”Specific performance”. 1978. University of Chicago 
Law Review 45, pp. 351-382. 
 
Lando Ole & Beale Hugh: “Principles of European Contract Law - 
Parts 1 and 2 – combined and revised”. 2000. Kluwer Law 
International. The Hague. 
 
 25
Maskin, E. & Tirole, J.: “Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete 
Contracts”. 1999. Review of Economic Studies 66, pp. 83-114. 
 
Nielsen, Søren Lehmann: ”Bygherrens ret til naturalopfyldelse”. 
1996. Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen, UfR.1996B.176. 
 
Rabel, Ernst: “Recht des Warenkaufs”. 1936. Berlin. (Reprint of 
1957 at ’Der Auflage von 1957’). 
 
Remien, Oliver.: ”Rechtsverwirklung durch Zwangsgeld”. 1992. 
Tübingen, Mohr.   
 
Report for (Danish) Parliament (Betænkning) No. 1170 of 1989. 
 
Schwartz, Alan: “The Case for Specific Performance”. 1997. Law 
and economics. Volume 2. Contracts, torts and criminal law, pp. 
65-100. 
 
Shavell S.: “Damage measures for breach of contract”. 1980. Bell 
Journal of Economics 11, pp. 466-490. 
Shavell S.: ´´Economic Analysis of Contract Law’’,  NBER Working 
Papers: 9696, 2003. 
 
Treitel, G.A.: “he Law of Contract”. 1995. London Sweet & Maxwell 
19th.ed. 
 
Ulen, T.: “The efficiency of specific performance: toward a unified 
theory of contract remedies”. 1984. Michigan Law Review 83, pp. 
341-403. 
 
Zweigert, Konrad & Kötz, Hein: ”Introduction to Comparative Law”. 
1998. Claradon Press Oxford 3.ed.  
 
